Learning to do responsible innovation in industry: six lessons

In general, we found that it is crucial that RRI is not effectuated in a ‘one size fits all’ fashion, but in such a way that it can be adapted to the specificities of particular companies or contexts. There is a need for both a bottom-up approach, as the one just described in this section starting from what is already happening in the company, and a more top-down approach, using and applying available and acknowledged RRI principles, practices, and tools.

To deal with this challenge, we developed an RRI roadmap methodology based on business-oriented, widely accepted innovation management methodologies. We took as references both existing management system standards, such as ISO 26000, ISO 31000, and CEN/TS 16555 and the concept of Innovation Policy Road-Mapping Methodology (IPRM), aiming to articulate societal needs and connect them to technological and industrial development policies and innovation strategies (Ahlqvist, Valovirta, and Loikkanen 2012). We developed a step-wise process, in which the company is asked first to identify the specific products to focus, the key ethical and social issues at stake, the stakeholders to involve, and then to experiment and practices, assess the value and eventually commit to RRI principles and practices. The overall goal is the development of an RRI roadmap, setting a vision and an action plan to integrate RRI into product development, from the early stages of R&I to market entry. Expert advice, and internal training to increase RRI skills and competences are seen as pre-requisite to develop the RRI Roadmap. As is shown by the positive response of the companies involved in PRISMA (all fully endorsed their final RRI roadmaps), this approach seems particularly apt to develop a tailor-made RRI strategy that is attuned to specific challenges, resources, expertise, and commitments of companies (Porcari et al. 2019). ¹

Place values center stage

The language of RRI is not (yet) familiar in industry. Rather, RRI discourse is perceived as academic and full of jargon (Dreyer et al. 2017). A commonly shared language is needed to improve the relationship between RRI approaches and existing company practices. Based on our experience, we think the concept of ‘values’ might be promising because they denote things worth striving for, such as safety, sustainability, integrity, openness and fairness. Companies often use values in their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policies, mission statements and corporate strategies (cf. Iatridis and Schroeder 2016). The idea that they should create shared value for themselves and society is also gaining prominence (e.g. Kramer and Porter 2011). The discourse of values also has the communicative advantage that it helps foreground what is considered important and desirable.

One way we learned to promote uptake of RRI activities in companies was to draw attention to tensions we witnessed among values pertinent to innovation (i.e. in which two or more values cannot be realized simultaneously).

In the case of a synthetic biology company there was a clear conflict between the values of sustainability and reliability. To be sure that their products are sustainable – as they claim – they would have to conduct a thorough LCA. However, because the production processes are constantly developing, an LCA would not make much sense because it would be soon outdated. This implies that the company believes they are making sustainable products, without knowing this for sure and without proof.

Another pilot, in the IoT domain, represented a complicated instance of possible value tensions, where the technology was in some contexts proposed as a way of safeguarding people’s control of their data, in some as a way of enhancing their privacy, and in some as a way of increasing cybersecurity. Those working on the project put forward sophisticated accounts of how all three goals could be simultaneously met.

In yet another pilot dealing with the application of organic based nanomaterials in dermo-cosmetic products, the technology was helpful to increase safety of the production process and efficacy of the product, but at the same time introduced potential consumer concerns about the use of advanced technologies in a product certified for using only organic (non-synthetic) ingredients. The dialogue between developers, producers, certification bodies and retailers was helpful to ensure transparency and improve confidence of all actors of the R&I value chain in the product.

From an RRI perspective, one would want to ensure that companies become aware of value tensions both in their normal operations as well as in their innovation processes. In many cases, there may be disagreement about how value tensions should be dealt with (or resolved) and/or there may not be one obviously best way to address them (van de Poel 2015). Nevertheless, companies have an opportunity to be transparent about, and accountable for how they choose to deal with value tensions and why they did so. It might in fact also have advantages for companies not only to accept accountability for how value tensions are dealt with but, also to actively communicate how they deal with value tensions. Such communication might also contribute to the corporate image of a company and so help the implementation of its business strategy.

Experiment for responsiveness

Like stakeholder engagement, anticipation is usually seen as a pillar of RRI. However, anticipation is notoriously difficult and thus its practical value for companies can appear limited. In such cases we suggest a shift to the RRI dimension of responsiveness, here understood as responding to new insights and developments as they evolve over time.

Companies are sometimes reluctant to introduce innovative technologies because they are unsure of the reactions of potential clients, publics, and other stakeholders (cf. Blok 2014). In the so-called waiting games that can result (Robinson, Le Masson, and Weil 2012), all actors wait for each other to take the first step in reducing uncertainty and, as a consequence, nothing happens, even if it is in everybody’s interest to reduce uncertainty.

We witnessed a somewhat similar situation in one of the pilots: the pilot company developed a technology for drones that would allow capturing images and data and analysing them in real-time. This could be helpful for monitoring and surveillance, for example for government tasks. It can also be intruding for privacy, however. The latter was addressed by using a tool that would automatically blur details of, for example, bystanders. Another issue was the safety of using autonomously flying drones in populated areas. Such use was forbidden by the current regulations. Although the government recognized that such drones could potentially be useful to fulfil public functions, it was reluctant to develop a new regulatory framework without operational experience with the use of drones in populated areas. The company, on the other hand, could not try out the drones, as that was forbidden.

To break such a deadlock, mechanisms are needed to gain experience with the new technology and to reduce uncertainty. One way in which this can be done is through (small-scale) niche experimentation (Kemp, Schot, and Hoogma 1998). Such initiatives also offer a potential for RRI. One may, for example, think of the creation of protected testing zones, where different regulations apply as to allow for experimentation, for example with drones or self-driving cars (cf. Weng et al. 2015). Another example is living labs, i.e. real-world environments, where new technologies are tried out and data are gathered about the use of the technology (Almirall, Lee, and Wareham 2012). Such experimentation can enhance learning about a technology; stakeholder reactions to the technology; and the ethical, legal and societal issues it raises and thus can help better align innovations, users, and societal needs. To address the very real possibility that such experiments may create risks or negative social consequences for society, however, it is important to create conditions for responsible experimentation (see e.g. Van de Poel (2016) for a proposal).

Monitor RRI progress

Most likely in the future, companies will continue to struggle to understand the value of their investments into RRI and not fully appreciate how it can enhance their goals and objectives. Monitoring the RRI performance of companies can help them measure, understand, and communicate the value of their RRI investments. To this end, we developed a tool that helps companies to formulate key performance indicators (KPIs) (Yaghmaei et al. 2019). Formulating KPIs may stimulate and help companies to think about what they want to achieve with RRI, and subsequently to monitor whether their RRI activities indeed help to achieve such objectives. It also allows an adaption or reformulating of the company’s RRI strategy and activities, if appropriate.

A crucial issue is whether such RRI monitoring should be done by the company itself or should include some form of external auditing. Both have their advantages and disadvantages. Internal monitoring would appear easier to implement and less sensitive for a company; moreover, as the company takes the initiative itself it may be more open to learn from experiences. On the other hand, internal monitoring only may raise doubts to the outside world, particularly if only positive assessments are communicated, leading up to the idea that monitoring merely provides a form of windows-dressing rather than a real commitment to RRI (cf. Taylor, Vithayathil, and Yim 2018). This issue raises similar considerations to discussions in evaluation studies on the purported goals of monitoring and evaluation in the first place (Kunseler and Vasileiadou 2016): are these activities undertaken to be able to be held accountable, or are they done to learn?

Aim for shared value

Innovators often see RRI as a means of gaining trust and legitimacy in the case of potentially controversial emerging technologies. We witnessed this particularly in the domain of synthetic biology. While RRI may indeed contribute to building trust and legitimacy, we witnessed two pitfalls or caveats to framing RRI as a trust building endeavor:

(1) RRI requires mutual trust. RRI often requires some initial mutual trust to begin with (Asveld, Ganzevles, and Osseweijer 2015). This requires not only that consumers, NGOs and publics trust companies, but also that companies trust these stakeholders. In one pilot in synthetic biology, such mutual trust was absent. Under such circumstances, RRI may actually become part of the conflict. NGOs that oppose a technology may perceive the RRI strategy of a company as a strategic move to gain public trust rather than as a genuine effort. Companies, on the other hand, may be reluctant to become more open and inclusive, as RRI would require, if they fear that this will fuel the controversy.

(2) Trust cannot be instrumentalised. Trust is something that is difficult to earn but easy to lose. Moreover, trust is essentially a by-product of (normal) interactions between parties – interactions through which parties can assess each other’s trustworthiness. Strategies that deliberately and explicitly aim at trust may not only misfire, but even be counterproductive, especially if a strategic dimension revolving around increasing stakeholders’ acceptance of technologies is at play.

Instead of striving to increase trust, we found that a more normatively desirable practical message is to strive to be trustworthy. This implies that one focusses on one’s own actions and explicitly leaves the decision to actually confer trust with others. Rather than promoting RRI as a means of increasing the legitimacy of innovations, we suggest that it be framed as a possibility to create shared value with society. Such a perspective also creates opportunities for companies, and other technology developers, to propose their own unique value proposition to society and, in doing so, to improve their corporate image and contribute to their business strategy.

Notes